We focus on one of the core competitive capabilities of modern firms: the ability to deliver successful innovations in a globalized environment. Companies literally find themselves confronted with a world of ideas. The challenge remains to decide which impulses should be on top of the list and which at the bottom. Given limited resources and substantial investments, betting on the wrong horse can be risky and costly. Theoretically integrated in capability based view of the firm we investigate firms' capabilities to assimilate, identify and prioritize valuable knowledge across national, cultural and social borders -a competence we call global sensing. We establish an analytical framework to examine whether global sensing activities generate competitive advantage. Consequently, we develop an empirical, multistage evaluation strategy. This strategy rests on a matching approach for a recent, broad sample of almost 1,700 German companies from both services and manufacturing. We find the strongest and most consistent support for global sensing as a strategic enabler for technological leadership. Apart from this strategic advantage we observe that foreign external sources of innovation are generally not superior to domestic ones.
Non-technical summary
The driving forces behind globalization (information technology and open market ideology) enable firms to source localized expertise in technology and demand. On the one hand, this makes the accessible pool of global innovation sources large and deep. On the other hand, it requires special expertise to pick the most promising fishing grounds and land the largest catch amid intensified global competition. Companies need an "early warning radar system" that enables them to keep track of recent technological and market trends worldwide as well as to distinguish between crucial signals and secondary noise. We investigate this global sensing capability and extend existing research on the theoretical and methodological side.
From a theoretical perspective we draw arguments from the capability based view of the firm and test whether global sensing is actually a competitive advantage generating capability of a firm. This is not clear from the outset. Global sensing implies identifying, synthesizing and combining knowledge across national, cultural and social borders. It is easier today to transfer information across borders, yet putting it into the right context to get the most out of it remains challenging. On the methodological side we introduce the novel technique of matching estimators to management studies which address a major shortcoming of the resource/capability based view of the firm: the lack of an empirical basis. In essence, matching estimators rely on a straightforward idea. If each global sensing firm can be matched with an almost perfect twin firm (e.g. same size, industry, region) from a control group, the remaining performance differences can be attributed to global sensing. On this basis, we develop a multistage evaluation framework that preserves the heterogeneity among firms and disentangles the effects of global sensing while controlling for context specific factors. Subsequently, we achieve an undisguised view of the strategic effects of global sensing. We test our evaluation framework empirically for a broad sample of more than 1,600 German companies from both manufacturing and services.
We find the strongest and most consistent support for global sensing as a strategic enabler for technological leadership. Companies that plan to build their competitive advantage around their technologically unique processes and competencies are more likely to search and find creative sparring partners outside of their home countries. We suggest that these reconnaissance activities are also more targeted and hence cost efficient for them. Pockets of elite technological expertise are less likely to be randomly scattered across the globe. Instead they need substantial physical investments (e.g. specialized labs) and, more importantly, a proven knowledge stock to arise. Hence they can be tracked and traced much more easily. What is more, our results also highlight the fact that foreign external sources of innovation are generally not superior to domestic sources for competitive advantage. Hence, neglecting this domestic innovation environment would be ill-advised.
Introduction
Globalization has not led to a borderless world (as suggested by Ohmae (1990) ) with universally homogeneous customers (as suggested by Levitt (1983) ). Market demands and technological opportunities remain globally heterogeneous and country specific. There is thus a need for efficient knowledge management since the basic sources of global competitive advantage remain local, sticky, diverse and dispersed (Doz et al., 2001 ).
The intensified exchange of products, services, capital and -most important to our analysis -know-how has created strong economic ties between geographically dispersed countries (Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001 ). Doz et al. (2001) identify three levels of competition in this global knowledge economy: Sensing (identifying and accessing new competencies, innovative technologies, and lead-market knowledge), mobilizing (integrating scattered capabilities and emerging market opportunities to pioneer new products and services) and operations (optimizing the size and configuration of operations for efficiency, flexibility, and financial discipline).
The mobilizing and operations aspects of this framework have received relatively more attention in the literature so far. 1 We focus on the sensing aspect: the ability of a firm to sense leading technological and market trends globally. The driving forces behind globalization (information technology and open market ideology) enable firms to source localized expertise in technology and demand (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Gupta and Westney, 2003) . On the one hand, this makes the accessible pool of global innovation sources large and deep. On the other hand, it requires special expertise to pick the most promising fishing grounds and land the largest catch amid intensified global competition. Companies need an "early warning radar system" that enables them to keep track of recent technological and market trends worldwide as well as to distinguish between crucial signals and secondary noise. We investigate this global sensing capability and extend existing research on the theoretical and methodological side.
From a theoretical perspective we draw arguments from the capability based view of the firm and test whether global sensing is actually a competitive advantage generating capability of a firm. This is not clear from the outset. Global sensing implies identifying, synthesizing and combining knowledge across national, cultural and social borders. It is easier today to transfer information across borders, yet putting it into the right context to get the most out of it remains challenging. Hence, these capabilities have the potential to generate competitive 1 Major topics include the sources of advantage for multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Dunning, 1981) , their organizational structure (Bartlett and Goshal, 1989) , balanced configurations between headquarters and subsidiaries (Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Prahalad and Doz, 1987) , knowledge flows between them (Birkinshaw and Fry, 1998) and the management of globally dispersed teams (Boutellier et al., 1998; Maznevski and Chudoba, 2000) .
advantage. This question is at the very heart of this paper: does global sensing produce measurable competitive advantage?
On the methodological side we introduce the novel technique of matching estimators to management studies which address a major shortcoming of the resource/capability based view of the firm: the lack of an empirical basis (Priem and Butler, 2001) . In essence, matching estimators rely on a straightforward idea. If each global sensing firm can be matched with an almost perfect twin firm (e.g. same size, industry, region) from a control group, the remaining performance differences can be attributed to global sensing. On this basis, we develop a multistage evaluation framework that preserves the heterogeneity among firms and disentangles the effects of global sensing while controlling for context specific factors. Subsequently, we achieve an undisguised view of the strategic effects of global sensing. We test our evaluation framework empirically for a broad sample of more than 1,600 German companies from both manufacturing and services. This paper follows an integrated design. The section subsequent to this introduction conceptually embeds global sensing in the capability based view of the firm. Section 3 condenses this argumentation into an analytical framework that can be tested. In section 4 we introduce the empirical tools to actually conduct these tests. Accordingly, section 5 discusses our results and is followed by our conclusions in section 6.
2

Conceptual Framework
The nature of global sensing
Literature identifies a number of reasons why companies have to think beyond their own boundaries and search for external sources for innovation: Competitive pressure, shorter product lifecycles, high investments, available external expertise (see for example Chesbrough (2003) ). Firms need a knowledge management system that picks the right sources, synthesizes the inputs and combines them with existing expertise (Gottfredson et al., 2005; Stock and Tatikonda, 2004) . In a globalized world modern information and communications technology as well as changing ideology increase the potentials from these external innovation inputs, most notably in China and India (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Gupta and Westney, 2003) . At the same time, the pockets of valuable expertise are becoming more globally diverse and dispersed (Doz et al., 2001) . The immense scope of potential knowledge increases the peril from strategic blind spots (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) or betting on the wrong horse. Competitive advantage can be achieved if companies have the competencies and capabilities to identify, combine and develop market and technology opportunities that are unarticulated, overlooked or underestimated (Von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002a) . We call this capability "global sensing." It includes sifting through the enormous amounts of prospective innovation signals from worldwide customers, competitors and suppliers, absorbing and prioritizing them and triggering an adequate organizational response.
Global sensing as a strategic capability
We suggested in the previous section that global sensing capabilities are a source of competitive advantage. We substantiate this claim by integrating it in the literature on the resource and capability based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) . Competitive advantage stems from internal resources and capabilities and subsequent proactive strategic choices to create and grasp market opportunities (Lado et al., 1992) . We argue that global sensing fits the criteria for a strategic capability because of the special kind of knowledge that has to be transferred and the capacities needed to synthesize and integrate them (i.e. component and architectural competence (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) ). Firstly, impulses from foreign customers, suppliers and competitors are valuable, specific and difficult to imitate or substitute. These resources are valuable because they generate three types of performance potentials (Bartlett and Goshal, 1987; Dunning, 1981 Dunning, , 1992 . These are responsiveness to foreign market conditions (e.g., tastes, regulations), learning from localized, country-specific expertise (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003) and efficiency through comparative cost advantages abroad (e.g., large supply of scientific personnel, 24/7 lab activities) (Von Zedtwitz, 2004) . They are specific because the particular configuration of foreign customers, suppliers and competitors is unique for a firms' value chain and difficult to imitate because the information that has to be transferred is often subtle, complex and sticky (Doz et al., 2001 ).
Secondly, we argue that competitive advantage through global sensing stems not only from the knowledge transferred but also from firms' capabilities to establish "pipelines to knowledge sources around the globe" (Malmberg and Maskell, 2005) . These potentials have to be identified, activated and managed to generate competitive advantage. Competitive capabilities imply the targeted deployment and combination of resources through organizational processes (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993) . Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) similarly use the concept of dynamic capabilities to describe the organizational and strategic routines through which companies trigger or adapt to market changes. Capabilities are cultivated in practice over time which makes them causally ambiguous and socially complex (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . This embeddedness makes them hard to acquire or imitate and therefore generates competitive advantage (Brush and Artz, 1999) . Identifying, sharing and exploiting valuable knowledge assets has been identified as such a source of competitive advantage (Zander and Kogut, 1995) . We extend this argument to global sensing by stressing the particularities of cross-border relationships. Synthesizing and applying existing and sensed knowledge (i.e. combinative capabilities, Kogut and Zander, 1992) across national, cultural and social borders requires intelligent processes and competencies that are built up over time. This includes identifying impulses from abroad and putting them in a fitting context to trigger an adequate response. Knowledge transfers across national borders have been found to be difficult and subject to losses (Branstetter, 2001; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999) . In particular, tacit knowledge often associated with face-to-face contact and shared experiences is of crucial importance but difficult to transfer across cultural barriers (Al-Laham and Amburgey, 2005; Liesch and Knight, 1999) . Frictional losses stem from increased transaction costs and principal-agent problems (Rugman and Verbeke, 2003; Von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002b) . These frequent mistakes and delays in cross-border situations have been summarized as liabilities of foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995) . Their prime drivers are costs related to spatial distance (travel, transportation, time zones), higher learning costs in the new environment due to a lack of roots, higher reputation costs due to a lack of perceived legitimacy in the host country and legal restrictions in the home country (Zaheer, 1995) . These liabilities of foreignness can be overcome through superior firm specific advantages and learning from foreign affiliates (Caves, 1971; Mezias, 2002 ).
In conclusion, we argue that impulses from foreign customers, suppliers and competitors are a strategic resource. Moreover, firms which can identify and transfer these inputs across national and cultural borders and combine them with existing knowledge can achieve competitive advantage. Hence we hypothesize that global sensing is a strategic capability.
3
Analytical framework
Capturing capabilities through matching estimators
The resource based view of the firm has come under criticism for lacking specificity, and neglecting dynamics in the firm environment and empirical validation (Hoops et al., 2003; Priem and Butler, 2001) . Priem and Butler (2001) suspect that "virtually anything" can be a resource. Hence, a methodology is required that empirically validates the effects from strategic resources and capabilities. This implies separating their contributions from other factors in the environment (e.g. industry). Conventional methods achieve this goal by comparing average firms. These comparisons of "averages" run counter to the central resource based concepts of uniqueness, heterogeneity and equifinality Daellenbach, 1999, 2002) . We suggest an approach that allows both context sensitivity and empirical verification: matching estimation.
In essence, the matching procedure follows the benchmarking rationale on a larger scale. Put simply, the matching procedure extends the simple idea of comparing mean differences between global sensing firms and the rest (control group). Instead of comparing apples and oranges it aims at identifying almost perfect twin companies from both groups. These twin companies are assigned based on propensity scores estimated from predefined context variables (e.g., same size, industry). The differences in firm performance between these twins can subsequently be attributed to global sensing. If these effects are positive and significant global sensing can be considered a strategic capability.
Matching approaches have been predominantly developed and discussed in labour market research (Heckman et al., 1998b; Heckman et al., 1999; Lechner, 2000) . The technique has also made inroads in industrial economics, most prominently through studies on the effects of public R&D subsidies (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2001; Czarnitzki et al., 2004) . We consider this approach especially fitting for empirical tests of the resource and capability based view of the firm for two reasons. Firstly, it compares firms with similar contexts and dynamics in their environment. Secondly, it preserves the heterogeneity among firms, which is a central pillar of the resource based view; i.e. firms are not compared to an average firm but to a firm that is relatively similar. Figure 1 summarizes the matching rationale. 
Relevant context and performance measures
The context of global sensing Amit and Schoemaker (1993) suggest that the resource based view of the firm complements traditional industry analysis and that internal and external factors have to be considered to understand the sources of competitive advantage. Along these lines several studies have argued that capabilities cannot be separated from their relevant context (Atuahene-Gima and Haiyang, 2004; Brush and Artz, 1999) . In line with Priem and Butler (2001) we define the relevant context as the "when, where and how" resources and capabilities translate into competitive advantage. We suggest that these context factors can be captured at three levels: the company's degree of internationalization (access and opportunity), the relevance of knowledge from abroad (need) and the competencies and processes the company has to leverage impulses from abroad (absorptive capacity). We shall now elaborate this categorization briefly.
Global sensing systems are naturally linked to the absorptive capacities of organizations: Levinthal, 1989, 1990) : The ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment, which is developed while performing R&D activities. Therefore R&D not only generates innovations by itself, it also supports the building-up process of knowledge within a company and its personnel (Engelbrecht, 1996) . We suggest that organizations develop certain skills and competencies when interacting with foreign customers, suppliers and competitors that enable them to establish channels across borders which subsequently serve as pipelines for valuable knowledge from abroad. Through this embeddedness they find it easier to transform these foreign impulses into inputs that can be injected in the company's innovation system. Therefore, we argue that global sensing activities are more efficiently conducted if the company and its employees possess previous experience in internationalization since the existence and richness of transmission channels propel knowledge flows (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) . Hence a company's degree of internationalization should propel global sensing activities. Besides, cultural barriers to knowledge flows have proven to be rather entrenched and persistent in society (Ghemawat, 2001 (Ghemawat, , 2003 . There is a need to address them organizationally, e.g., by recruiting managers from abroad or with foreign experience (O'Grady and Lane, 1996) .
Moreover, we suggest that global sensing activities are targeted. They focus on compensating an -at least perceived -shortage in the quality or quantity of suitable domestic sources. These relative shortcomings can originate at the country, industry or firm level. Push factors might propel domestic companies to exploit their firm-specific advantages abroad but they might also experience pull factors from superior foreign inputs (Le Bas and Sierra, 2002) . These drivers could be structural (e.g., barriers to competition) or cognitive (e.g., high information costs) in nature (Dunning, 1981) . This process is dynamic. It can be stimulated through intensified international competition or offshoring activities from important customers or suppliers (Doz et al., 2001) . Additionally, the development stage within the innovation process is important. As Pearce (1989) and Dunning (1992) suggest, applied R&D activities should more likely be decentralized, while fundamental basic research is better conducted domestically.
In conclusion, firms need access to relevant knowledge that fits their needs and adequate absorptive capacities to leverage these inputs. Hence in line with Sofka (2005) we conceptualize the mechanisms behind global sensing as a combination of three factors: access, need and absorptive capacity.
Performance effects of global sensing
Global sensing can only be considered a strategic capability if it generates competitive advantage through superior firm performance. Hence there is an obvious need to define the latter. The performance potentials from global sensing have been outlined before: responsiveness, learning and efficiency (Bartlett and Goshal, 1987) . We break these concepts down in line with the literature on innovation controlling (Hauschildt, 2004; Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001 ). Additionally, we distinguish between strategic outcomes (i.e. a firm's cost and quality position from global sensing) and strategic potentials (i.e. whether global sensing enables firms to choose a cost or quality leadership strategy for the future).
Following this line we suggest measurement constructs which will guide our subsequent empirical study. As operative effects of global sensing (strategic outcomes) we suggest the share of turnover a company can achieve through market novelties, the sales increase it can achieve through quality improvements and the cost reductions it can generate through innovative processes. Obviously, strategic potentials are a less tangible construct. Hence, we suggest surveyed management ratings for certain strategies. These strategies are industry leadership with new products, technological leadership and cost leadership. Table 1 summarizes the operationalization and emphasizes its integration in the conceptual framework. 
Data and variables
For the empirical part of this paper we use cross section data from a survey on the innovation behavior of German enterprises called the "Mannheim Innovation Panel" (MIP) The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research. The methodology and questionnaire of the survey, which is targeted at enterprises with at least five employees, are the same as those used in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), conducted every four years by Eurostat. For our analysis we use the 2003 survey, in which data was collected on the innovation behavior of enterprises during the three-year period 2000-2002. About 4,500 firms in manufacturing and services responded to the survey and provided information on their innovation activities. 2 We utilized this data to operationalize the concepts presented above.
Additionally, we complemented this dataset with international trade data provided by the OECD (ITCS -International Trade by Commodity Statistics 2003 and TIS -Trade in Services 2004) and data on business R&D expenditures (ANBERD -R&D Expenditure in Industry 2003).
Our dataset of observations without any missing values consists of 1,664 companies. 324 of those indicated that they had used at least one foreign customer, supplier or competitor as a source of innovation (global sensing). Non-innovating firms are excluded. This is the full sample which we will use at the first and second stage of our evaluation scheme. For step three (net potential from global sensing) we restrict our dataset to firms which used external business sources (foreign or domestic). To achieve a more homogeneous sample we exclude companies from Eastern Germany. This leaves us with 405 observations. 209 of those had used a foreign business source for innovation. This relatively high portion has methodological implications. We will return to this issue at stage three of our evaluation scheme.
Naturally, global sensing activities cannot be readily observed. Some employee might read a foreign newspaper or receive an e-mail from a foreign friend that would serve as an impulse for in-house innovation activities. Still, we do not consider it helpful to draw too broad a spectrum of potential global sensing activities. We therefore focus on major activities that let domestic companies feed relevant technological or market information into their innovation processes. These sensing activities may result from active screening or could be the byproduct of other activities. We want to judge the utilization of these particular sources on its 2 The sample was drawn using the stratified random sample technique. A non-response analysis showed no distortions. For a more detailed description of the dataset and the survey see Janz et al. (2001) and Rammer et al. (2005). merits. Therefore, we conclude that a company is conducting global sensing activities once it has indicated that it has used innovation impulses from foreign 3 customers, suppliers or competitors. 4 A detailed description of all variables can be found in section 7.3 of the annex.
The industry classification is based on grouped NACE 2 and is detailed in section 7.4 of the annex.
Evaluation scheme
Based on the foundations presented so far we suggest a three layer evaluation design. At all levels of the evaluation we will judge the strategic effects of global sensing based on the comparison of actual strategic outcomes. For this we initially divide our sample into two sub samples: those enterprises that have conducted global sensing and a comparison group that has not. We will refine this comparison group step by step. The three evaluation layers are briefly outlined.
As a baseline case we conduct a prima facie comparison between the global sensing firms and all other companies. That is, we ignore the firm context to generate a benchmark case for all subsequent steps of the analysis. Secondly, we restrict the comparison group to companies that closely resemble our global sensing firms based on the contextual factors presented above. The differences in strategic outcomes can now be attributed to the global sensing activities since we have controlled for other sources of heterogeneity. We call the resulting differences in strategic outcomes between the two groups "gross potential of global sensing." Third, we restrict our comparison group to companies that have sensed for external innovation sources domestically and again construct a homogeneous sample based on context factors. We will interpret the remaining differences in strategic outcomes as the "net potential from global sensing." This implies that we investigate the extra effect a firm can achieve from extending its search for external sources across national borders. Figure 2 summarizes our approach.
3 To be precise, respondents were asked to name the country of origin of their innovation impulse. Thus, the term foreign implies that they named a country other than Germany. 
Matching procedure
Our analytical setting is typical for evaluation analyses. Since we can easily distinguish between our two groups of companies and their choice to sense globally or not, this is clearly not random, we operate in a non-experimental setting. This allows us to utilize the estimation strategies offered by the literature on the econometrics of evaluation. We opt for the matching procedure (additional methodological considerations can be found in section 7.1 of the annex). It controls for observed heterogeneity and necessitates no assumptions on the functional form of the outcome equations or the distribution of the error terms of the selection or outcome equations (Czarnitzki et al., 2004) .
The procedure works as follows (Czarnitzki et al., 2004; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002) . All companies are divided in two groups: global sensing companies and the remaining control group. Matching is based on the idea that the counterfactual situation of the controls can be estimated from the global sensing firms. The matching estimator generates a sample of global sensing firms which are comparable to the control firms. This comparability is based on a set of a priori defined characteristics (context factors). These characteristics would typically translate into same size or same industry. This produces matched control firms. As comparability with respect to this predefined criteria is achieved between global sensing companies and matched control firms the differences between them in the outcome variables can be explained exclusively through global sensing activities 5 .
There is an obvious necessity to identify a suitable vector of context variables that defines these criteria of comparability. One would be tempted to develop a vector as large as possible to achieve a high degree of comparability. This endeavour has a downside. One runs into the curse of dimensionality (Czarnitzki et al., 2004) : as the number of matching criteria increases it becomes harder to identify control observations. Rubin (1983, 1985) solve this problem by reasoning that it is sufficient to balance the samples based on an equal propensity score (or probability) for global sensing. We use the previously introduced framework of access, need and absorptive capacity (ANA) to identify comparable context factors. The operationalization of these ANA-components follows Sofka (2005) . More details can be found in section 7.2 of the annex. A probit estimation based on these components will provide the propensity scores for all subsequent analytical steps.
We introduce two additional modifications to our estimation strategy to enhance the quality of the results. First, we complement the propensity score matching with additional conditions to guarantee a proper threshold of comparability. Lechner (1998) suggests this so-called "hybrid matching". In our study this implies that propensity score matching will only be applied to companies which are roughly equal in terms of size (number of employees), industry and regional location (West or East Germany).
6 Secondly, concentrating on properly matched pairs of companies improves the quality of our analysis. Hence, we focus on matched pairs with "common support", i.e. observations with propensity scores above the smallest maximum and below the highest minimum of all sub-samples are eliminated (Czarnitzki et al., 2004) .
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These differences are usually termed "average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)." The terminology follows matching labor market studies which evaluate the effects of training programs on the unemployed. Those programs are considered a "treatment" and the program participants are the "treated." In our context global sensing is the treatment and global sensing firms are the treated. We consider these terms confusing for our research question and will henceforth avoid them. 6 We use Mahalanobis distance measures for the conditioning of these variables.
In conclusion, the matching protocol in Figure 3 summarizes our matching approach. This approach was implemented through psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) .
Content analysis
Baseline case: Prima facie comparison
In essence, our estimation strategy attempts to provide an answer to the core question of this paper: How does the strategic performance of a company change if it uses global sensing? The hypothetical nature of this question already points towards the challenges in tackling it empirically. The counterfactual situation cannot be observed. One might intuitively suggest comparing the average outcomes between companies that did use these particular sources of innovation with those who did not (prima facie comparison). This procedure would most likely be subject to a selection bias, i.e. the companies in the two groups differ in important characteristics. Thus differences in the outcome variables could not only be attributed to different patterns for using external sources but they could also be explained by differences in size, location or industry effects, to name a few. With this in mind we conduct a prima facie comparison to generate a baseline benchmark for the subsequent stages of analysis. With this very basic tool one would be tempted to conclude that global sensing firms are better off on all accounts and companies should rush to establish international sensing capabilities because these will guarantee them competitive advantage. This conclusion would be dangerously myopic. Global sensing firms and the control group differ on a variety of items and each of these mitigating factors could explain large portions of the differences in competitive performance. Section 7.5 gives a full descriptive comparison, so we shall restrict ourselves here to briefly outlining the major differences.
Global sensing companies have roughly six times more employees than the average control firm. Global sensing firms are much more internationalized. Almost every third Euro of their turnover stems from exports while this is only one out of ten for the control group. They are also much more frequently part of a multinational group. While global sensing companies operate in industries in which Germany has a relatively strong international competitiveness (RCAs), the German shares of business expenditures on R&D are roughly equal for both groups. Global sensing firms are both more self-reliant in their innovation activities and more R&D intensive than the control group. They are also much more sensitive to obstacles to innovations than the control firms across the board. Finally, global sensing firms have higher absorptive capacities on average, indicated by the share of college educated employees, relative R&D expenditures and management programs for stimulating innovativeness. In conclusion, a technique needs to be found that addresses these mitigating factors and allows a more unbiased assessment of the strategic value of global sensing.
Gross potential of global sensing
We apply our empirical matching strategy as outlined in the protocol. As a first step we conduct a probit estimation (our dependent variable is binary in nature: global sensing firm or not) with the ANA variables. Table 10 of the annex outlines the results. 8 The coefficients of the probit estimation support the results from Sofka (2005) . We refer to this paper for a discussion of the various effects. At this point we want to focus on performance effects and merely use the probit estimation as a vehicle to achieve meaningful propensity scores.
To enhance the quality of our matching estimation we exclude observations with extreme propensity scores since these are unlikely to produce meaningful benchmark comparisons. The effect of this so-called common support conditioning on our sample is rather limited. Two global sensing observations have to be dropped, leaving us with 322 global sensing companies for further investigation. Subsequently, we conduct the matching for these firms. We add an additional quality check by investigating whether global sensing companies and their matched controls are still significantly different with regard to the variables from the probit estimation. For the vast majority of our variables this is not the case. We can assure that our matched pairs are similar with regard to their industry, size, degree of internationalization and regional location (West/East Germany). For full disclosure we present the mean differences before and after matching in Table 11 of the annex.
Finally, we focus on the outcome variables to compute the treatment effects. Table 3 displays the results. We start the discussion by outlining the merits of our matching procedure based on the first variable: share of turnover with market novelties. In an unmatched state comparing means among the two groups would have suggested that global sensing does in fact increase success with market novelties. After the matching, we know that this result is misleading, as it is effectively based on a comparison of apples and oranges. The matching tells us that when we compare similar companies between the groups, there is no significant difference in turnover with market novelties.
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The estimation performs well with a fit of 0.54 (Aldrich Nelson Pseudo R 2 ). This makes us confident that we have achieved an adequate foundation for all subsequent steps of our matching procedure.
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Observations larger than the smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of both groups are eliminated. When focusing on the results we find that global sensing does still generate competitive advantage. The internationalization in source usage does not readily translate into a higher share of turnover with market novelties but it does help to refine products (services) and processes. While success is still created within the company and its domestic competitive environment (Porter, 1990) , responsiveness and efficiency can be achieved by learning from the foreign parts of the value chain (Bartlett and Goshal, 1987) . What is more, this input generates strategic potentials across the board, in technology, costs and timing. While economic efficiency might be achieved in the home market (Porter, 1996) , sustainable competitive advantage requires access to the scarce, regional pockets of competitive excellence across the globe (Doz et al., 2001; Porter, 1990) . Hence, we can actually identify configurational, metanational advantages (Craig and Douglas, 2000; Doz et al., 2001 ) from using foreign business sources for innovation.
Net potential of global sensing
At this point of the analysis one might argue that our analytical approach measures sensing capabilities in general but not global sensing exclusively. We address this issue by fine-tuning our empirical approach. Instead of benchmarking global sensing firms against matched controls from all other firms we constrict this potential control group to firms with sensing activities (global or domestic). This reconfiguration emphasizes the 'global' aspect in global sensing and therefore provides additional insight. On the downside, limiting the pool of potential benchmark firms reduces the a priori probability of producing effective matches. We refine our matching procedure accordingly.
To be precise, we have previously outlined a matching procedure that finds the best matching control company for any given global sensing company. This technique is called "nearest neighbor" matching and is the general backbone of the matching analysis. However, in this second step of our investigation we will apply a different matching procedure to a subsample. In this sub-sample the number of global sensing and control firms is fairly equal. While it would still be possible to find a suitable control for every firm (a firm can serve as a control for more than one global sensing company) the danger of using a single control firm too often increases. Hence, for the sub sample we choose a different algorithm from the methods surveyed by Heckman et al. (1999) . The matching protocol laid out in Figure 3 still applies with a notable exception in step 4. Instead of choosing one particular control firm we construct a weighted match from all control firms. The weights are derived from the differences in propensity scores. An exact match gets a large weight; a poor match has a small weight. The function to generate these weighted matches is called kernel. We utilize the widely-used Epanechnikov kernel (Mueser et al., 2003) . Therefore, this procedure is called Epanechnikov kernel matching.
As indicated before, we investigate our net potential from global sensing by narrowing our sample to companies from Western Germany that had used an external business source for innovation (domestic or foreign). For these 405 observations we conduct a probit estimation with the same parameters as before. The results of this estimation are presented in Table 12 of the annex. The fit of this probit estimation is not as good as the previous one but still acceptable (Aldrich Nelson Pseudo R 2 0.28). This might be due to the significantly reduced sample size and the fact that there are no companies in our sample that use foreign business sources exclusively. This leads ultimately to a more homogeneous sample with less variance, which explains the lower fit of this probit model. Nevertheless, we are confident that our Epanechnikow kernel matching strategy delivers high quality results. We base this certainty on the fact that there are no significant differences between the variables of our probit estimation after matching (six observations were dropped due to common support; the full set of unmatched and matched mean differences is presented in Table 13 of the annex). Therefore, we compute the following effects. Even at first glance, it becomes visible that the special benefit from using foreign business sources for innovation stems from the learning leverage point (Bartlett and Goshal, 1987) . For all other performance aspects the merits derived can hardly outweigh the increased costs from crossing physical and cultural borders. Still, when it comes to leading technology, companies need to source this input wherever it occurs on the globe. If these inputs can be leveraged through the value chain instead of foreign direct investments the risks from betting on the wrong horse in a volatile environment can be severely reduced (Doz et al., 2001) . Therefore, we find our argumentation from the previous section condensed but substantiated.
Conclusion
Our study was designed to thoroughly investigate whether global sensing is a strategic capability. We incorporate several features in our evaluation scheme to ensure that our findings are of a proper quality. On the methodological side, we find the matching approach a very suitable tool for this kind of in-depth evaluation of strategic resources and capabilities. From our experience its unique positive features are twofold: first and most obviously, it controls for contextual factors in the environment while preserving heterogeneity. Secondly, the technique of choosing an almost ideal twin company and assessing the outcome effects based on remaining observable differences makes the matching procedure more accessible and comprehensible for practitioners. They find it easier to relate to the results if the procedure on which it is based intuitively makes sense to them and do not require going into too much empirical detail.
These methodological aspects aside, we find the strongest and most consistent support for global sensing as a strategic enabler for technological leadership. Companies that plan to build their competitive advantage around their technologically unique processes and competencies are more likely to search and find creative sparring partners outside of their home countries. We suggest that these reconnaissance activities are also more targeted and hence cost efficient for them. Pockets of elite technological expertise are less likely to be randomly scattered across the globe. Instead they need substantial physical investments (e.g. specialized labs) and, more importantly, a proven knowledge stock to arise. Hence they can be tracked and traced much more easily.
Secondly, we find no support for the notion that global sensing would provide companies with more success when bringing novel products and services to the market. We argue that global sensing delivers the best results at the beginning and the end of the innovation process. At initial levels new technological opportunities trigger projects, while market inputs at the final stages benefit customizing and debugging activities. At the intermediate stages of the innovation process firms may be more reliant on other competencies and capabilities. We suggest that these unique internal capabilities are still the prime sources of market success with new products while global sensing allows fine tuning and streamlining of products and processes. The results for cost reductions and quality improvements at the gross potential level of analysis support this argument. Nevertheless, longitudinal data would be required for more robust explanations.
We benefited from a large database across many industries, both from manufacturing and services. Still, at this point we can only empirically map the German perspective. We suggest that comparative international studies would yield some additional insights. It would be very interesting to see whether global sensing in the US and Japan has similar results. What is more, we expect a generally different attitude towards global sensing from developing countries.
In conclusion, the purpose of this study was to bring sensibility to the issue of global sensing. While we recommend companies to harvest the benefits of globalization through the access to exciting ideas worldwide, we also caution that global sensing is no magic wand. What is more, our results also highlight the fact that foreign external sources of innovation are generally not superior to domestic sources for competitive advantage. Hence, neglecting this domestic innovation environment just because "global sounds better" would be ill-advised. Just because globalization has opened up space for new branches on the company tree, there is no need to axe or drain local roots. Heckman et al. (1999) and Heckman et al. (1997) present a comprehensive survey of techniques to correct for selection biases. There is no universally superior estimation strategy. The method of choice has to be the most appropriate one for a given dataset (Heckman et al., 1998a) . The difference-in-difference estimator for instance requires panel data which is not available to us. For cross-section data, instrumental variables (IV) estimators are a frequent choice. IV estimators are an option in our setting. Still, they require at least one variable that is related with the decision to sense globally but otherwise unrelated to the strategic outcome Costa Dias, 2000, 2002) . Hence, the requirements for such a perfect instrumental variable are high. Given the limitations of our dataset and the previous conceptual discussion on relevant context factors, we find it difficult to identify an instrumental variable which would not ultimately impair our results. Hence, we opt for the matching procedure.
Annex
Methodological matching issues
The matching procedure basically rests upon two central conditions: the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and the stable unit treatment value condition (SUTVA). Rubin (1977) introduced the conditional independence assumption. It implies that treatment and potential outcomes are independent for observations with the same set of matching characteristics (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2001 ). The validity of CIA cannot be tested empirically (Almus et al., 1999) . Given the broad range of variables in our dataset and the fact that the Mannheim Innovation Panel data has been used in the past for several matching studies (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2001; Czarnitzki et al., 2004) as well as with respect to internationalisation activities (Arnold and Hussinger, 2004) , we are confident that the CIA makes a reasonable approximation. Angrist et al. (1996) demand that the treatment status of a particular firm must not influence the outcomes of others. Since the usage of foreign suppliers, customers or competitors as a source for innovation (treatment) can not be observed by other firms, we consider it more than unlikely that this fact would influence their outcome variables. Therefore, SUTVA holds for our empirical investigation.
Operationalization of the ANA framework
Access
Access is captured as a firms' degree of internationalization. We use export intensity 10 as a measurement for internationalization performance and being part of a multinational group 11 for structural internationalization (Sullivan, 1994) . To incorporate the supposed curved-linear relationship between the degree of internationalization and derived utility from using external sources from abroad, we additionally introduced the squared export intensity as a separate variable. To account for firm size we introduce the logarithm of the number of employees and for regional effects whether a company is located in the eastern part of Germany or not. For the effect of exceedingly large co-operations the squared values of firm size is added, too.
Need
This item operationalizes actual or perceived deficits within a company or its domestic environment. Shortcomings could be due to country-, industry-or firm-specific factors. We therefore introduce Germany's revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 12 among OECD countries in 2002 at the industry level as a measure for competitive performance and the German share of OECD business R&D expenditures (BERD) by industry in 1999 13 as a measure of competitive potential (Buckley et al., 1988) . Openness to new products on domestic markets and domestic market dynamics are measured by the share of turnover with market novelties in the industry.
At a firm level we introduce self-reliance in innovation activities which suggests a pronounced need for external sources. Additionally, the share of turnover taken up by R&D expenditure 14 is a proxy for the importance of innovation activities for the company. By including the squared value of this variable in the model we address companies operating with an extreme degree of R&D intensity. This follows the idea that applied R&D is better decentralized while more fundamental R&D is better performed centrally at home (Dunning, 10 We use the lagged values for 2001 in this case to achieve clarity in interpretation; for the 2002 data it would be unclear whether an increased export intensity was the result of source usage from abroad or its cause (endogeneity).
11
In line with Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) we distinguish between multinational groups with headquarters in Germany and abroad to account for different levels of international exposure.
12
The strength of the RCA analysis stems from the opportunity to assess how successful a country has been on foreign markets (exports) in comparison to the foothold foreign competitors were able to gain in that country's domestic market (imports). Additionally, this ratio is compared to the overall export/import ratio of a particular country to the world as a whole. To be precise, this concept measures not only whether exports of a specific product have outweighed imports, but also whether the trade position for this particular product has been stronger than the overall trade performance of the country considered. At the same time, its formulation in logarithmic terms yields continuous, unbound and symmetric results (Wolter, 1977). 13 1999 is the most recent year featuring a high level of data availability. 14 As stated before, at this point it is not totally clear whether an increased R&D intensity is the result of the usage of foreign sources or its cause (endogeniety). To clarify this casual relationship with R&D intensity as the cause we rely on lagged values for 2001. 1992). While high R&D intensity alone can certainly not provide convincing evidence of basic R&D, it should (carefully) be treated as a reasonable indication in that direction. Finally, three firm-level dummy variables are introduced to the model to account for obstacles to innovation which might in turn trigger a search process for external innovation sources from abroad: high risks and the closely related high costs of innovation projects, a lack of technological information and unfavorable conditions in regulation or governmental bureaucracy (Buckley and Casson, 1998) .
Absorptive capacity
Absorptive capacities are not a tangible concept but rather a combination of different competencies and capabilities. Hence companies cannot be easily surveyed to estimate the degree to which they possess these absorptive capacities. We use the employees' level of education and academic achievement (Rothwell and Dodgson, 1991) , companies' relative strength in R&D 15 compared to the industry average Levinthal, 1989, 1990 ) and a variable for the importance management attributes to stimulating innovation (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Lord and Ranft, 2000) .
Furthermore, border effects have been found to be less pronounced in certain industries, such as semiconductors (Irwin and Klenow, 1994) . Hence, six additional, instrumental industry group 16 variables have been introduced to capture industry-specific aspects that would distort the explanatory power of our other exogenous variables. Cost reduction due to process innovation in per cent stratfirstprod Importance of innovation strategy, industry leader with new products on a four point Likert scale (3 equals "high") strattechleader Importance of innovation strategy, technology leadership in the industry on a four point Likert scale (3 equals "high") stratcostleader Importance of innovation strategy, cost leadership on a four point Likert scale (3 equals "high") These industry groups are more broadly defined as "other", "medium high-tech" manufacturing, and "distributive", "knowledge-intensive" and "technological" services. The base group in all cases is "other" manufacturing. 
Variables
